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Saturday 15 September 2012

Prison as the Third Tier of Social Control - when drugging young people with psychotropics and psychiatric admission hasn't worked.

   This pattern mirors the exponentialgrowth of psychotropic drugs in children 









INCARCERATION RATES 

PER 100,000 OF POPULATION





Is this a three layered model of Social Control?



Prison as a Strata of Social Control
by James P. Lynch and William J. Sabol

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195172.pdf 

James P. Lynch is a Professor with American University in Washington, D.C.
William J. Sabol is Senior Research Associate at the Center on Urban Poverty and
Social Change, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.





Over the past 20 years, the United States has experienced a massive
increase in imprisonment. The number of people incarcerated and the clustering of that incarceration in the inner-city black population raise the prospect that incarceration may be undermining less coercive institutions of social control such as families or communities. The long-term result of this incarceration policy, then, would be increases, rather than the expected decreases, in crime. There is some empirical evidence to support this position. Increases in incarceration have been clustered in groups and places and have been of the magnitude that could affect less coercive institutions in those areas. Large proportions of the imprisoned population are involved in families and communities
at the time of their imprisonment. Incarceration has been
shown to reduce family formation for blacks but not for whites.
Research to date, however, has not demonstrated that increasing
incarceration has led to more crime in the long run or that the apparent effects of incarceration on other institutions are not due to other factors. If research ultimately establishes that these allegations are true, then future increases in incarceration must be considered in light of their likely long-term effects on these institutions and not just their immediate effect on crime rates.

Over the past 20 years, the United States has experienced a massive
increase in imprisonment (Gilliard and Beck 1996; Lynch and Sabol  1997; Blumstein and Beck 1999). It is not clear what caused this increase, e.g., increases in crime or changes in policy, and it is even less clear what the effects of this policy have been or will be. Traditionally, evaluations of incarceration assess its effects in terms of the recidivism of individual offenders or the reductions in aggregate crime rates (Nagin 1998; Blumstein, Cohen, and
Nagin 1978; Levitt 1996). More recently, the number of people incarcerated and the clustering of that incarceration in inner-city black populations raise the prospect that incarceration may be undermining less coercive institutions of social control, such as families and communities (Lynch and Sabol 1992;
Rose and Clear 1998a, 1998b; Clear 1996; Moore 1996; Nightingale and Watts 1996). To the extent that these less coercive institutions of social control are the first line of defense against crime, then disrupting them may mean that the long-term consequences of the massive increases in incarceration of
the past 15 years will be increased crime (Rose and Clear 1998a).
Allegations that incarceration undermines less coercive institutions of social control are largely speculative. The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate the existing evidence that recent increases in incarceration have had such effects. We will also suggest research that should be done to test this contention
further.

The first of the following sections reviews evidence that the level of incarceration has increased and that this increase has been clustered in social and geographic space. Establishing these facts is crucial for the argument that incarceration can plausibly affect less coercive institutions of social control. The second section
reviews and evaluates the evidence that increases in incarceration have had detrimental (or beneficial) effects on less coercive institutions of social control.

The third and final section outlines the research required to better assess the impact of incarceration on less coercive institutions of social control.
Trends in the Level and Distribution of Incarceration

The use of incarceration has increased massively over the past 15 years, both in terms of the number of persons in prison on a given day and in terms of the cumulative number of persons experiencing incarceration over that period. This intrusion of incarceration into society has not been randomly distributed in social and geographic space. It has been greatest for young black males, first in
central cities and more recently in smaller urban areas (Lynch and Sabol 1997; has approached 10 percent on a given day and 30 percent in their lifetimes (Lynch and Sabol 1992; Bonczar and Beck 1997). Over time, incarceration has touched more persons who have relatively strong ties to society (Lynch and
Sabol 1997; Harer 1993). These trends suggest that changes in the use of incarceration have made imprisonment so prevalent in some groups as to disrupt less coercive institutions of social control.

Evidence from stock rates
The population in correctional institutions has increased substantially since 1980 (see exhibit 1). The number of persons in State and Federal prisons increased from 315,074 in 1980 to 1,138,984 in 1996. The incarceration rate per 100,000 increased from 139 to 423—a 204-percent increase. During the same period, the jail population increased from 182,288 to 557,974. The total
incarcerated population increased from 497,362 to 1,696,958.
This increase in the use of incarceration has not been uniform across groups.

For blacks, the risk of being incarcerated increased from 554 per 100,000 to 

Exhibit 1. Rate of incarceration in State and Federal prisons,
by gender, race, and Hispanic origin, 1980 and 1996
Number of Number of prisoners sentenced prisoners a year in %
        
1980 1996 change 1980 1996 change
Male 303,643 1,069,257 252 275 810 195
Female 12,331 69,727 465 11 51 364
Whitec 132,600 378,000 185 73 193 164
Black 145,300 524,800 261 554 1,574 184
Hispanic 30,700 200,800 554 206 690 235
Total 315,974 1,138,984 260 139 423 204

 Based on prisoners with a sentence of more than 1 year. The numbers for race and Hispanic origin were estimated based on the State inmate surveys in 1979 and 1997 and the Federal inmate survey in 1997. Estimates have been rounded to the nearest 100.
b Based on census estimates of the U.S. resident population on July 1 of each year and adjusted for the census undercount.

 Excludes Hispanics.
Source: Blumstein and Beck 1999, table 1.

PRISON USE AND SOCIAL CONTROL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000

1,574 per 100,000. For whites, it increased from 73 per 100,000 to 193 per 100,000 (Blumstein and Beck 1999). Although blacks are about seven times more likely than whites to be incarcerated, this disproportionality has remained relatively constant over time. In absolute terms, however, the increase in the rate of people incarcerated has been much greater for blacks than whites. For
purposes of assessing the disruption of less coercive institutions of social control resulting from incarceration, absolute increases are much more important than increases relative to some base number of incarcerated persons at an earlier period.

While the racial disproportionality in the prison population has remained reasonably constant overall, it has increased for drug offenders. The incarceration rate for black drug offenders has increased much more than the rate for whites.
This is consequential for our argument because there is some evidence that drug offenders tend to be more integrated into the community than violent offenders (Cohen and Canela-Cacho 1994; MacCoun and Reuter 1992).
Removing integrated persons is more disruptive of less coercive institutions of social control than removing less integrated persons.

The incarceration rate for underclass males increased 139 percent between 1979 and 1986, from 560 to 1,340 per 100,000 (see exhibit 2).2 During the same period, the non-underclass incarceration rate increased by 33 percent, from 330 to 440 per 100,000. When these rates were distinguished by race and class, the risk of incarceration increased the most for the black underclass, followed by the white underclass, the black non-underclass, and the white non-underclass (see exhibit 3).
There was a marked change in this pattern of incarceration use from 1986 to 1991. The incarceration of the underclass slowed while the imprisonment of the non-underclass increased (Lynch and Sabol 1994). When these changes in incarceration rates are disaggregated by offense, we see that the greatest increase in incarceration rates is for the black non-underclass sentenced for
drug offenses, followed closely by the black non-underclass imprisoned for violent offenses (see exhibit 4).

Over time, the State prison population has included a larger proportion of inmates who did not have a violent incarceration offense and who had not been incarcerated previously (Lynch and Sabol 1997). In 1979, 5.7 percent


Exhibit 2. Adult male incarceration rates per 100,000 for underclass

and non-underclass, 1979 and 1986
Year
Underclass status 1979 1986 % change
            Underclass 560 1,340 139
     Non-underclass 330 440 33

Exhibit 3. Adult male incarceration rates per 100,000 by race
and class, 1979 and 1986
     Race* Class 1979 1986 Change

White Underclass 281 706 425
   Non-underclass 194 256 62
Black Underclass 1,634 3,242 1,608
  Non-underclass 1,824 2,116 292

* Other race categories were not included because of small numbers and the unreliability of the Hispanic classification over time and place of inmates were admitted for a drug offense and had no prior convictions for violence. By 1986, that proportion had changed little, to 7.0 percent. In 1991, however, 17.8 percent of inmates were in for drug offenses and had no prior incarcerations for violence. This is consistent with the previous finding that,
after 1986, incarceration increased for the black non-underclass, if we can assume that this group had less prior criminal involvement than the underclass.

Evidence from admissions rates
Consistent with national data on the incarcerated population, the increases in admissions to prison differ considerably across race and offense, but they also differ across size of place and over time.3 Admissions rates for blacks are higher than those for whites for both drugs and violence and across all types of places. These differences change in magnitude, however, across crimes, places,
and times. In 1984, the ratio of black-to-white incarceration rates for violence in larger urban areas (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas [PMSAs]) was 11.4, and in smaller urban areas (Metropolitan Statistical Areas [MSAs]), the
ratio of black-to-white admissions was somewhat less at 9.4. By 1987, the differences in admissions rates across races lessened somewhat (8.9 in PMSAs and 7.1 in MSAs). These ratios remained roughly similar through the period 1987 to 1993.
During the same period, drug admissions rates changed dramatically, as did the differences in these rates across race groups and place. From 1984 to 1987, the black admissions rates more than doubled in MSAs (77.8 per 100,000) and increased more than four times in the largest urban areas (114.3 per 100,000).
This is in a period when violence admissions rates were relatively stable, and the drug admissions rates for whites increased by 42 percent in PMSAs and 12.6 percent in MSAs. By 1990, black admissions rates for drugs had doubled again. In 1993, the black drug admissions rate remained stable in the largest places (203.3 per 100,000) but increased substantially in the MSAs, to 190
per 100,000—approximately the rate observed in the PMSAs.

Exhibit 4. Adult male incarceration rates per 100,000 by race, class, and offense: 1979, 1986, and 1991
   Offence Race* Class 1979 1986 1991
Violent White Underclass 139 335 334
                Non-underclass 106 132 191
             Black Underclass 899 1,934 1,258
             Non-underclass 1,015 1,291 1,738

  Property White Underclass 109 268 245
                      Non-underclass 67 81 117
                 Black Underclass 554 953 609
                    Non-underclass 592 554 816
       Drugs White Underclass 18 57 180
                     Non-underclass 14 25 71
                Black Underclass 123 206 877
                   Non-underclass 147 161 919
       Other White Underclass 16 46 71
                       Non-underclass 7 18 415
                  Black Underclass 59 149 169
                     Non-underclass 70 109 222

* Other race categories were not included because of small numbers and the unreliability of the
Hispanic classification over time and place. 
Taking account of accumulation
In assessing the effects that prison has on society, we
often forget that some effects may not come from the
number entering prison in a given year or the number
incarcerated on a given day, but from the volume of
persons passing through or exposed to prison. To the
extent that prison leaves a “taint,” this is an appropriate
way to assess its possible effects (Freeman 1992).
Bonczar and Beck (1997) estimate that nearly 30 percent
of the black male population 20 years of age and
older will be incarcerated at least once in their lifetime.
If serving a sentence in jail (as opposed to State
or Federal prison) were included in this calculation,
the proportion ever incarcerated would be greater.
Whatever the true lifetime prevalence of incarceration,
it is clear that imprisonment is so commonplace
among black men that any taint resulting from imprisonment
could substantially affect these men and the
groups to which they belong.

These changes in the level and distribution of incarceration are consistent with the contention that incarceration has changed in ways that can undermine less coercive institutions of social control. The level of incarceration has increased massively, which increases the likelihood of disrupting groups rather than individuals.

These increases are highly clustered in social and geographic space,
which further increases the likelihood of group disruption. The proportion of the population removed has been much greater for blacks than for whites and much greater in central cities than other places.4 Moreover, the increases in incarceration have, over time, moved into population segments that were formerly immune. Greater numbers of the non-underclass and non-central city populations have been incarcerated, as well as persons with little criminal history who were incarcerated for nonviolent (largely drug) offenses. Removing more such people, who were integrated into social groups prior to imprisonment, increases the likelihood that those groups will be disrupted.

Evidence of the Breakdown in Noncoercive
Institutions of Social Control
  Although the foregoing description of changes in the level and distribution of incarceration suggests that incarceration increases have disrupted less coercive methods of control.

The level of incarceration has increased massively, which
increases the likelihood of disrupting groups rather than
individuals. These increases are highly clustered in social
and geographic space, which further increases the likelihood
of group disruption.

 The nature of the evidence required will depend on the specific processes that link incarceration with the demise (or robustness) of less coercive institutions of social control. Consequently, we
must review the conceptual models that link incarceration with less coercive institutions of social control, then proceed to the relevant empirical evidence.

Models of the effect of incarceration on
less coercive institutions of social control

Although this review is focused on the potentially negative effects of incarceration on less coercive institutions of social control, it is essential that we also consider the possible positive effects of imprisonment on these institutions.

Therefore, we review models explaining both the possible negative and positive effects of incarceration policies.

Models of positive effects
Traditionally, the principal benefit of incarceration has been crime reduction through incapacitation or deterrence. Until recently, this has been reason enough to warrant imprisonment. Beneficial effects of imprisonment were believed to occur because of increases in the certainty and severity of punishment or because the offender was simply removed from society. Nagin (1998) acknowledges the evidence in support of deterrence but cautions against overgeneralizing its applicability. He asserts that the deterrent effect of incarceration may depend on the social context in which it is applied and, specifically, whether imprisonment stigmatizes the offender in his family and community.

Absent this stigmatization, deterrence will not occur (Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Nagin’s argument is not that imprisonment will bolster less coercive institutions of social control, but that without these less coercive institutions of social control, imprisonment may not deter crime. The novelty of Nagin’s argument is the linkage of imprisonment to less coercive institutions of social control, rather than viewing it alone as an instrument of crime reduction.

There is virtually no theory or empirical work that associates imprisonment directly with building or supporting less coercive institutions of social control.
Most of the beneficial effects of imprisonment on less coercive institutions of social control are expected to occur through crime reduction. So, removing an abusing spouse from the home will improve the functioning of a family.
members may be sufficient to stop the behavior and thereby help the family (Sherman 1995). The improved functioning of the family should provide for socialization and supervision of children and thereby lower crime rates.
Similarly, actually removing criminals from communities or plausibly threatening incarceration can reduce crime rates in neighborhoods or the fear of crime.
This, in turn, would permit the interaction among neighbors that provides the informal controls to promote community organization and reduce neighborhood crime. These types of causal processes underlie programs like Weed and Seed (Dunworth and Mills 1999) and are summarized in exhibit 5. Although these
models have been discussed, they have never been tested empirically.

Exhibit 5. Model of the positive effects of incarceration on
less coercive institutions of social control
Voluntary associations
Community solidarity
Informal social control
Crime

Neighbouring
Coercion
Stability
Crime

Models of negative effects
There are various routes and processes by which incarceration can adversely affect less coercive institutions of social control. Lynch and Sabol (1992; 1997; 1998b) speculated that incarceration would reduce the marriageability of men and thereby reduce marriage formation. This, in turn, would increase the number of female-headed households in areas with high incarceration rates and, ultimately, increase crime rates due to an absence of supervision for young males in these areas (Sampson 1987). They speculated that the marriageability of men would be reduced by (1) their removal through incarceration, and (2) the taint of a prison record in the job market. This simple model is summarized in exhibit 6.
effects of incarceration. This model describes how community disorganization leads to crime. The principal exogenous variables in the model are heterogeneity, mobility, and socioeconomic status. These variables can facilitate or inhibit interaction in communities that allow residents of that community to set and achieve collective goals. They can enhance private control within intimate
groups as well as “parochial” control outside of intimate groups but in the area.
Parochial control would include control in the context of neighboring and in voluntary associations. Heterogeneity, mobility, and socioeconomic status can also affect the amount of public control in a community by influencing that community’s ability to negotiate services with municipal bureaucracies,
including the criminal justice system. In Bursik and Grasmick’s model, the levels of private, parochial, and public control in a community determine the crime rate. Communities that are stable and homogeneous will have high levels of private and parochial
control as well as optimum levels of public control, resulting in relatively low levels of crime.
Rose and Clear (1998a) elaborate on this basic model by hypothesizing that incarceration will introduce mobility and heterogeneity into communities, and thereby abet the process of disorganization (see exhibit 7). They focus specifically on certain institutional arrangements that will be weakened by incarceration
and how this weakness, in turn, will reduce private, parochial, and public control in these communities.

Incarceration will weaken families by removing men from families and by reducing the supply of marriageable men. This will make families

Exhibit 6. Model of negative effects of incarceration
on institutions of social control
Supply of men
Incarceration
Marriageability of men
Family formation
Parochial controls
Privatecontrol
Crime

Incarceration will weaken families by removing men from
families and by reducing the supply of marriageable men. 
This will make families less effective as socializing agents
and less able to supervise teenage children.

Source: Lynch and Sabol 1998a.

less effective as socializing agents and less able to supervise teenage children.
Removal through incarceration will also affect economic institutions in communities by removing people who bring money to families and the community.
Political institutions will be affected by removing people from networks that mobilize the community in response to external threats. There will be gaps in the network so that mobilization of the community will be incomplete.
Moreover, removing persons from the area will mean that those who take up their tasks have less time for the mobilization process. Rose and Clear (1998a) also hypothesize that massive use of incarceration in communities will lessen the stigma (and hence the effectiveness) of this type of public control for
community residents.
Evidence for the positive effects of incarceration
on less coercive institutions of social control
There is almost no direct empirical evidence that incarceration strengthens less coercive institutions of social control where incarceration, crime reduction, and changes in such institutions are included in the same study. The negative

Exercise of public control
Level of incarceration
Exercise of private control
Human/ social capital
Residential stability
Socioeconomic composition
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity
Effective socialization
Exercise of parochial control
Crime rate

Exhibit 7. Nonrecursive model of crime control, social
disorder, and crime
Source: Rose and Clear 1998.

association between imprisonment (and other forms of coercion) and crime has been the subject of extensive study (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; Ehrlich 1973; Levitt 1996; Nagin 1998). That crime reduction has beneficial effects on less coercive institutions of social control has been largely assumed.
Incarceration is alleged to reduce crime either through the process of incapacitation or deterrence. Incapacitation assumes that incarceration reduces crime by removing an individual from society so that the crime he would have committed will be prevented or moved to an institutional setting. Imprisonment can
also reduce crime if the threat of punishment is sufficient to prevent would-be criminals from engaging in crime. There is considerable empirical evidence for and against both the incapacitation and deterrent effects of incarceration. Much of this evidence is seriously flawed so that unequivocal inclusions are difficult to draw. The preponderance of the evidence, however, is that incarceration both
incapacitates criminals and deters crimes, but it is not clear when and under which conditions incarceration will lead to reduced crime.

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