Popular Posts

Total Downloads Worldwide

Wednesday 20 June 2012

THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY - still has major methodological and ethical concerns over DSM5 due to its poor statistical validity and inter-rater reliablity along with the dubious 'catch all' / over-inclusive categories which will be likely to hugely increase the chance of 'false positive' diagnoses for a range of these 'loose cluster' criteria in their response : "DSM-5: The future of psychiatric diagnosis (2012 - final consultation)" - PLUS previous BPS submission (2011) and statements from the BPS on this crucial issue.


 British Psychological Society still has concerns over DSM-V.

http://www.bps.org.uk/news/british-psychological-still-has-concerns-over-dsm-v 

CLICK LINK FOR ACCESS TO BPS SITE and the full DSM5 Consultation Response.

+ SIGN PETITION: http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/write-the-wrongs-in-dsm-5-n-i-c-e-must-issue-guidanc.html

 The British Psychological Society has responded to the final consultation on the DSM-V diagnostic framework. You can read our full response on this website.

Dr David Murphy, Chair of the Society’s Professional Practice Board, says:

    The Society applauds the American Psychiatric Association for engaging in this level of public consultation, and we welcome some of the changes from the previous iteration, such as the deferment of the decision to include the category of ‘attenuated psychosis syndrome’  and to recommend further research.

    However we continue to have serious concerns about many aspects of the framework. In our response we have argued that the categorical framework of DSM-V is flawed in that it fails to take account of the evidence for the dimensional spectrum of psychiatric symptoms such as low mood, hearing voices, unusual beliefs etc in the general population.

    We have also highlighted significant concerns about lowering of diagnositic thresholds and the validity ‘catch all’ diagnostic categoroies that exist within DSM-V such as ‘ADHD not elsewhere classified’, which we are concerned have poor inter rater reliability.

    We are concerned that both of these aspects lead to the risk of overdiagnosis and thereby potentially unnecessary and potentially harmful treatment with medication.


About this Response :
 

This response was prepared for the British Psychological Society by Dr Catherine Dooley,CPsychol, AFBPsS, committee member of the Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP), Chair of
the DCP’s Professional Standards Unit, and member of the Division of Neuropsychology andthe Faculty for Psychology Specialists Working With Older People, 


With contributions from:
 

Isabel Clarke, CPsychol, member of the DCP, Chair of the Faculty of Psychosis and Complex Mental Health (FPCMH), and member of the Transpersonal Section;

Dr David Harper,CPsychol, AFBPsS, member of the DCP and the FPCMH;

Lucy Johnstone, CPsychol, AFBPsS,past committee member of the DCP, and member of the FPCMH; 

Professor Peter Kinderman,CPsychol, AFBPsS, past Chair of the DCP;

David Traxson, CPsychol, committee member and
commenting on behalf of the Division of Educational and Child Psychology; 


and David Trickey, CPsychol, member of the DCP and the Faculty for Children and Young People.

We hope you find our comments useful.


THE RESPONSE JUNE 2012 : 

The British Psychological Society (BPS) thanks the American Psychiatric Association for the opportunity to respond to this consultation.

General comments
The BPS welcomes recognition that DSM 5 needs further consultation, but does not consider that the updated proposals fully address the serious reservations raised in our response to the 2011 consultation (BPS, 2011).

The validity of the basic categories is assumed, rather than evidenced from research into distress across both psychiatric and ‘normal’ populations which might challenge the appropriateness of the paradigm. In this circular process, both the original suggestions and subsequent modifications are based more on committee decision and public responses than on patterns arising out of the identification of underlying mental phenomena.

In the absence of such signs, judgments about pathology are inevitably grounded in subjective and cultural norms. This is particularly obvious in the case of ‘Personality Disorders’, (criterion ‘D’ for ‘Personality Disorder’: “The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait expression are not better understood as normative for the individual’s developmental stage or socio-cultural environment”), but also applies across the spectrum of functional diagnoses.

The BPS continues to believe that, by not taking account of the evidence for the dimensional spectrum of psychiatric symptoms such as low mood, hearing voices, unusual beliefs and so on across the general population, retention of a categorical model is a methodological flaw, particularly but not exclusively for ‘functional’ rather than ‘organic’ disorders.

We also are concerned that the revised proposals have failed to take account of the growing body of evidence implicating relationship and social factors as the primary risks for mental distress across the range of psychiatric presentations, including 'psychosis'. A recent editorial in the British Journal of Psychiatry (Read and Bentall, 2012) summarised this research and called for a paradigm shift in our understanding of mental distress. We recommend a return to basic science without preconceptions.

We consider that, as it stands, the revised DSM-5 would lead to an ongoing risk of pathologising individuals while obscuring well-established social and relationship causal factors. A considerable body of evidence from service users/survivors testifies to the damaging consequences of this approach (eg Geekie et al, 2012.)

Finally, as outlined in our 2011 response (BPS, 2011), we are particularly concerned about “catch-all” categories which have a particularly weak conceptual basis, as demonstrated by the fact that one third of people diagnosed with a personality disorder fall under the heading ‘Not otherwise specified’ (Traxson, 2010). This includes all catch-all terms such as "atypical ….." and "sub-clinical, normal variation ….." which wev feel will greatly increase the risk of 'false positive diagnoses particularly for children. Personality disorder and psychoses are particularly troublesome as they are not adequately normed on the general population, where community surveys regularly report much higher prevalence and incidence than would be expected. A more scientific approach, less likely to lead to the over-diagnosing of conditions such as ADHD and bipolar disorder in children, would be to research the extent of such experiences within the wider population without making a prior assumption of pathology.

For all the reasons stated above, the BPS, having reviewed the currently proposed revisions of the new diagnostic criteria in DSM 5, continues to have major concerns. These have, if anything, been increased by the very poor reliabilities achieved in many of the recent field trials (Huffington Post, 2012), especially given the limited time available to attempt to achieve more satisfactory outcomes. Since validity depends, at the very least, on acceptable levels of reliability, the unavoidable conclusion is that many of the most frequently-used categories will be unable to fulfil their purported purposes, i.e. identification
of appropriate treatments, signposting to support, providing a basis for research, etc.

Additionally, given that the potentially harmful effects of psychiatric medication are well-documented, the BPS is concerned that the risks of over-diagnosis outlined earlier may result in the inappropriate use of potentially significant adverse consequences.

References:

PS (2011) http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publicationfiles/consultation-responses/DSM-5%202011%20-%20BPS%20response.pdf
Accessed May 2012

Geekie, J., Randal, P., Lampshire, D., & Read, J. (eds) (2012). Experiencing psychosis: personal and professional perspectives. London, New York: ISPS for Routledge.

Huffington Post (2012)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/dsm-5-reliability-tests_b_1490857.html
Accessed June 2012

Jiron, C., Chiodo, A., & Sherrill, R. (1995). Is ADHD being overdiagnosed? Paper presented at the National Academy of Neuropsychology, San Francisco, CA.

Lane C. (2009) Shyness How Normal Behaviour Became a Sickness. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press

Read J. & Bentall R. P. (2012) Negative childhood experiences and mental health: theoretical, clinical and primary prevention implications. British Journal of Psychiatry, 200: 89-91.

Traxson,D (2010) The Medicalisation of Normal Healthy Childhood.- BPS-DECP Debate Magazine – Sept 2010.


Comments on specific disorders

Code Title Comment on Proposed Revision Comment on Severity

A 06
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder

Although not a revision, we are concerned that the use
within the descriptor of “……for at least 6 months to a
degree that is inconsistent with developmental level…..
could be part of the explanation for the finding that youngfor-
age-group children are more likely to be diagnosed
and medicated for ADHD (Morrow et al, 2012). Indeed,
Elder (2010) also reinforces the point that younger
children in an age cohort show more immature behaviour
and should not be stigmatised as a result.

In fact, the differential diagnosis rates for the existing
condition between the U.S. and the U.K. of 8% to 1.5%
are in themselves evidence of the potential risk for overdiagnosis
based on cultural or geographical variables.
Further evidence raising doubts about the validity of the
diagnostic criteria was described by Jiron et al (1995) in a
study of children who were diagnosed with ADHD and
subsequently referred to a specialist clinic due to their
poor response to standard interventions. They found that
75% of the sample experienced a wide range of
alternative causes of their symptoms, including postconcussion,
depression, learning disability and adjustment
problems as the primary cause of their behavioural
functioning.

References:

Elder, T. (2010) The Importance of Relative Standards in
ADHD Diagnosis: Evidence based on exact birth dates.
Journal of Health Economics, 29, (5), p641-656

Jiron, C., Chiodo, A., & Sherrill, R. (1995). Is ADHD being
overdiagnosed? Paper presented at the National
Academy of Neuropsychology, San Francisco, CA.

Morrow, R. L., Garland, E. J., Wright, J. M., Maclure, M.,
Taylor, S., Dormuth, C. R. (2012). Influence of relative
age on diagnosis and treatment of attentiondeficit/
hyperactivity disorder in children.
http://cmajopen.com/content/184/7/755.full.pdf+html
Accessed June 2012.

A 07
Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) Not
Elsewhere Classified

Regarding the wording “….may be coded in cases in
which the individuals are below threshold for ADHD or for
whom there is insufficient opportunity to verify all criteria.
However, ADHD-related symptoms should be associated
with impairment, and they are not better explained by any
other mental disorder.
We are concerned that this wording is so vague as to be
impossible to operationalise in a consistent way raising
the potential for an unscientifically based ‘false positive’
diagnosis to be made.
Usually if a person is below the threshold for something
then logically they do not have the condition so it is
unclear why this is not the case here.

Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic
Disorders Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (proposed for section III of the DSM-5)

The BPS welcomes the continued debate and deferment
of decision on the inclusion of this category, and the
recommendation for future research.
In considering the risk of transition to full disorder, studies
that compare individuals with equivalent symptoms but
who have found or been presented with different
contextualisations for their anomalous experiences have
not been considered.

Research (e.g. Brett et al 2009, Heriot-Maitland 2011)
indicates a powerful role for contextualisation in
determining whether such experiences become
problematic and associated with significant impairment of
functioning or not.
Considered alongside studies on the stigmatizing effect of
psychotic diagnosis, we believe that caution in including
this lower level of diagnosis is indicated because of the
iatrogenic harm attendant on medical conceptualisation of
disorienting anomalous experiences, which can be
distressing, but might otherwise be viewed more benignly,
and managed with social support.

References:

Brett, C.M.C., Johns, L., Peters, E., & McGuire, P. (2009)
The role of metacognitive beliefs in determining the
impact of anomalous experiences: A comparison of helpseeking
and non-help-seeking groups of people experiencing psychotic-like anomalies. Psychological Medicine. 39, 939-950.

Heriot-Maitland, C., Knight, M. and Peters, E. (2011). A qualitative comparison of psychotic-like phenomena in clinical and non-clinical populations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
8260.2011.02011.x

B 08 Schizophrenia Regarding the rationale for introduction of
dimensionality. 

The BPS welcomes this development.
In justifying dimensionality for hallucinations and delusions, reference is made to the impact of new ways of thinking about these symptoms introduced by CBT. Elsewhere the overlap between diagnoses is
noted.
The insights of CBT, particularly recent developments
employing mindfulness to impact on the way in which
the individual relates to their symptoms, with
beneficial results (Chadwick et al, 2005; Chadwick et
al, 2009) could lead to giving greater weight to factors
such as social functioning, distress and employability,
as opposed to symptoms, in diagnosing the disorder
and the severity. Such a change of emphasis would
accord with the Recovery initiative (Shepherd et al,
2008).

References:
Chadwick, P.D.J., Newman-Taylor, K. & Abba, N.
(2005). Mindfulness groups for people with distressing
psychosis. Behavioral & Cognitive Psychotherapy,
33(3), 351-360.

Chadwick P, Hughes S, Russell D, Russell I, &
Dagnan D.(2009) Mindfulness groups for distressing
voices and paranoia: a replication and randomized
feasibility trial. Behavioral Cognitive Psychotherapy.
37(4):403-12.

Shepherd, G., Boardman, J. & Slade, M. (2008)
Making Recovery a Reality.
http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/publications/
making_recovery_a_reality.aspx?ID=578
Accessed June 2012.


G03 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Overall the revision is a very welcome clarification of the
criteria. Specifically, the addition of cognitive elements in
section D, and the decrease in avoidance symptoms in
section C are especially valuable and clinically useful
changes.

Subtype: PTSD in preschool children:
Including a subtype for preschool children is an extremely
important and helpful step in classifying (and decreasing)
reactions to traumatic events in young children, and is a
very welcome addition to the criteria.
In the preschool children subtype, the avoidance
symptoms are split into two separate groups (C1&2), both
of which refer to external stimuli. We suggest this
separation is unnecessary, particularly as only one
symptom is required from either of the two groups, and it
would be more straightforward to merge the two.
With regard to the criteria defining the event in the
preschool children subtype “A.2. witnessing, in person,
the event(s) as they occurred to others, especially primary
caregivers”. We suggest that that the phrase “especially
primary caregivers” could potentially confuse the
diagnosis, as exposure either does or does not fulfil the
criteria.

Subtype: PTSD in preschool children:
The severity scale is obviously aimed directly at the
person who has been traumatised, whereas with the
preschool subtype, diagnosis and classification will be
made based more on the report of the carers. It would
be very helpful to make a note to this effect in the
severity text.

S03 Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder

The BPS is concerned that the proposed new
diagnostic category “Mild Neurocognitive Disorder” might
be diagnosed in elderly people whose memory decline
simply reflects normal ageing. We welcome the use of an
objective psychometric criterion within this particular
DSM-5 diagnosis but has concerns about potential for
misdiagnosis of normal ageing given that the evidence is
that less than 40% of people diagnosed progress to
dementia (Mitchell & Shiri-Feshki, 2009)
We would further highlight the importance of valid
psychological interpretation of test results since the
proposed psychometric threshold encompasses one in
eight of the normal population. There is a particular
danger that cognitive functioning of people from ethnic
minorities is under-represented on psychometric tests.

Reference:
Mitchell, A. J. & Shiri-Feshki, M. (2009) Rate of
progression of mild cognitive impairment to dementia
meta analysis of 41 robust inception cohort studies.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19236314#
Accessed June 2012.

Q00 Oppositional Defiant Disorder

The BPS remains concerned that the criteria lack
statistical rigor and will exacerbate ‘false positive’
diagnoses in future practice. The descriptors do not
adequately or rigorously define a coherent pattern of
behaviours. There is very little use of the conventional
behavioural descriptors of frequency, intensity, duration
and occurrence.

Q 04 Disruptive Behaviour Disorder Not Elsewhere
Classified

Regarding the descriptor “This category is for individuals
who exhibit symptoms of Conduct Disorder, Oppositional
Defiant Disorder, or both disorders but the number of
symptoms does not meet the diagnostic threshold for
either diagnosis and there is evidence of clinically
significant impairment associated with the symptoms.”
Although there is only a minor wording change from DSM
IV, this is another example of a ‘catch all’ category which
will broaden the rates of diagnosis of such conditions.
As mentioned previously, we are concerned that these
could cause stigma, iatrogenic harm and result in
significant side effects due to the unnecessary medication
prescribed as a result of false positive diagnoses.


End

 

British Psychological Society issues statement in response to DSM-5 encouraging members to sign Coalition for DSM-5 Reform petition
December 13, 2011 


The Society has today (13 December 2011) released a statement expressing concerns regarding the proposed revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, which is one the main internationally-used classification systems for diagnosis of people with mental health problems in clinical settings and for research trials.

The Society for Humanistic Psychology (Division 32) of the American Psychological Association (APA) has recently published an open letter to the DSM-5 taskforce raising a number of concerns about the draft revisions proposed for DSM-5 and citing a number of issues raised previously by the BPS.

In its statement today, the Society shares the concerns expressed in the open letter from the Society of Humanistic Psychology (Division 32) of the APA and encourages members of the Society to read the letter themselves and consider signing the petition.

David Murphy, Chair of the Society’s Professional Practice Board said:

“The Society recognises that a range of views exist amongst psychologists, and other mental health professionals, regarding the validity and usefulness of diagnostic frameworks in general and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, in particular.

“However, there is a widespread consensus amongst our members that some of the changes proposed for the new framework could lead to potentially stigmatizing medical labels being inappropriately applied to normal experiences and also to the unnecessary use of potentially harmful interventions.

“We therefore urge the DSM 5 taskforce to consider seriously all the issues that have been raised and we would echo the American Psychological Association’s call for the taskforce to adhere to an open transparent process based on the best available science and in the best interest of the public”.

You can read the Society statement in full online.

Open PDF on the BPS site here: BPS Statement on DSM-5 12.12.11

Or open PDF here, on Dx Revision Watch: BPS statement on DSM-5 12-12-2011

Text version

    British Psychological Society statement on the open letter to the DSM-5 Taskforce

    The British Psychological Society recognizes that a range of views exist amongst psychologists, and other mental health professionals, regarding the validity and usefulness of diagnostic frameworks in mental health in general, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association in particular.

    The Society for Humanistic Psychology (Division 32) of the American Psychological Association (APA) has recently published an open letter to the DSM-5 taskforce raising a number of concerns about the draft revisions proposed for DSM-5 which has, to date, been endorsed by 12 other APA Divisions.

    A major concern raised in the letter is that the proposed revisions include lowering diagnostic thresholds across a range of disorders. It is feared that this could lead to medical explanations being applied to normal experiences, and also to the unnecessary use of potentially harmful interventions.

    Particular concern is expressed about the inclusion of a new diagnostic category “Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome”. This proposes to include individuals who are experiencing hallucinations, delusions or disorganized speech “in an attenuated form with intact reality testing” but who do not meet current criteria for a psychotic disorder. The Society shares the concerns expressed in the open letter about the potentially harmful consequences of lowering diagnostic thresholds in general and the questionable validity of this proposed diagnosis in particular.

    Another concern raised is about the impact of proposed revisions on vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly. The letter highlights that the proposed new diagnostic category “Mild Neurocognitive Disorder” might be diagnosed in elderly people whose memory decline simply reflects normal ageing. The Society welcomes the use of an  objective psychometric criterion within this particular DSM-5 diagnosis but shares concerns expressed in the letter about potential for misdiagnosis of normal ageing. We would further highlight the importance of valid psychological interpretation of test results since the proposed psychometric threshold encompasses 1 in 8 of the normal population. There is a particular danger that cognitive functioning of people from ethnic minorities is under-represented on psychometric tests. The Society also shares concerns about the potential for children and adolescents to be misdiagnosed with Disruptive Mood Deregulation Disorder.

    We also concur that there is a lack of a solid basis in clinical research literature for this disorder and are also concerned about the risk of harm from inappropriate treatment with neuroleptic medication.

    The proposals for the revision of the personality disorders section in DSM-5 are described in the open letter as “perplexing”, “complex” and “idiosyncratic”. The Society has welcomed the move to a dimensional-categorical model for personality disorder. However, we have said that this has not been as visible as expected in the draft revisions.

    Moreover, we share concerns expressed in the open letter about the inconsistency of the proposed changes and their limited empirical basis.

    Finally, the open letter also draws attention to proposals to revise the basic “Definition of a Mental Disorder” and, in particular, a statement proposed by Stein et al that it “reflects an underlying psychobiological dysfunction”. The Society shares concerns about any unsubstantiated shift in emphasis towards biological factors and in particular the entirely unjustified assertion that all mental disorders represent some form of biological dysfunction. We are, however, reassured by the response from the APA task force (4 November 2011) which states that there is no intent “to diminish the importance of environmental and cultural exposure factors” and hope that this will be reflected in the final version.

    In conclusion, the British Psychological Society endorses the concerns expressed in the open letter from the Society of Humanistic Psychology (Division 32) of the APA and encourage members to view the letter themselves and consider signing the petition (http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/dsm5/ ). We also urge the DSM 5 taskforce to consider seriously the issues raised therein. These have been now been endorsed by a broad range of experts in mental health, including members of the British Psychological Society and two chairs of previous DSM revision taskforces.

    We are, however, encouraged that the DSM taskforce has already responded positively to the open letter and that in their letter (4 November 2011) they emphasized that the manual is “still more than a year away from publication and is continually being refined and reworked”. They commented that “Final decisions about proposed revisions will be made on the basis of field trial data as well on a full consideration of other issues such as those raised by the signatories of the petition.”

    In a statement issued on 2 December 2011 the American Psychological Association (APA) called upon the DSM-5 Task Force to “adhere to an open, transparent process based on the best available science and in the best interest of the public”. The British Psychological Society would certainly echo this call.

    The final draft of the DSM-5 criteria is due for publication in early 2012 followed by a third, two month, period of public feedback. The Society encourages those members who have relevant expertise to contribute to the on-going process of refinement and improvement of the DSM-5. As a Society we are, as is our counterpart the APA, committed to promoting and disseminating psychological knowledge and, as such, we are keen to ensure that the final version of DSM-5, and other internationally used diagnostic frameworks such as ICD-11, are based on the best available psychological science and will continue to monitor the DSM-5 revision process and contribute further as appropriate.


PREVIOUS BPS STATEMENT CALLING FOR REVIEW FEB 2011:

 The British Psychological Society lends it support to the call for a national review of the use of medication to treat children’s behavioural issues including temporary sleep problems, mild social anxiety and shyness.

Peter Kinderman, Chair of the Division of Clinical Psychology said: “We welcome the announcement from the government pledging an extra £400 million for the provision of psychological therapies – including the promise of better support for parents and children with behavioural problems. However, we are concerned that the overall cuts to the public sector will place all of mental health care – including care for children - at risk.
“We know BPS members are involved in excellent work with Child and Mental Health Service teams, but child mental health is an area that is grossly under resourced, resulting in too few children and young people being able to get timely access to the appropriate therapy. Within the BPS we are already working closely with our psychiatry colleagues to ensure better mental health across the board. If there is evidence of inappropriate use of drugs or medication then we’re sure that our psychiatry colleagues  would be equally concerned.


“Clearly, it is important to understand children’s behavioural and psychological problems fully, and to invest in proper, expert, therapeutic approaches. We would be very concerned if children were being prescribed medication as a quick fix rather than accessing the full assessments and psychological therapies which take may longer and cost more, but ultimately are likely to be better value in the long run.”


Figures released by the Department of Health show that in 2009 the number of prescriptions issued to 16-18 years olds to treat ADHD had risen by 51% in just two years.


Peter concluded: “Clearly, many children unfortunately have behavioural and emotional problems which of course demand appropriate care. Many psychologists are very concerned at the use of psychiatric and medical diagnoses in cases such as this – not only because of doubts about the validity of many of the diagnostic approaches, but also because of the possible adverse effects of the medication. Children for whom the diagnosis of ADHD is being considered should receive full multidisciplinary assessments, the option of receiving psychological and behavioural therapies, and their parents or carers should be offered parent-training and education programmes.  Drugs should be considered as an option but this should be part of an overall therapy programme. In the case of problems such as temporary sleep problems, mild social anxiety and shyness, I fail to see how medicalising these problems and contemplating the use of drugs is justified. These may indeed be problems, but they are problems that clearly deserve a more psychological response”.


The call for a national review is also supported by the Society’s Division of Educational and Child Psychology.
PR: 1848 8 February 2011

http://www.youtube.com/user/Humanagement2011

For more information on these issues. 



DSM-5 2011
British Psychological Society response, June 2011
Page 1 of 26
Response to the American Psychiatric Association:
DSM-5 Development

The British Psychological Society thanks the American Psychiatric Association (APA) for the opportunity to respond to the DSM-5 Development.
The British Psychological Society (“the Society”), incorporated by Royal Charter, is the learned and professional body for psychologists in the United Kingdom. The Society is a registered charity with a total membership of almost 50,000.
Under its Royal Charter, the objective of the Society is "to promote the advancement and diffusion of the knowledge of psychology pure and applied and especially to promote the efficiency and usefulness of members by setting up a high standard of professional education and
knowledge".
The Society is committed to providing and disseminating evidence-based expertise and advice, engaging with policy and decision makers, and promoting the highest standards in learning and teaching, professional practice and research. The Society is an examining body granting
certificates and diplomas in specialist areas of professional applied psychology.
We are content for our response, as well as our name and address, to be made public. We are also content for the APA to contact us in the future in relation to this response. Please direct all queries to:-
Consultation Response Team, The British Psychological Society,
48 Princess Road East, Leicester, LE1 7DR.
Email: consult@bps.org.uk Tel: (0116) 252 9508

This response was prepared on behalf of the Society by Professor Peter Kinderman, CPsychol, AFBPsS, Chair of the Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP), with contributions from Susan van Scoyoc, CPsychol, CSci, AFBPsS, committee member of the DCP and member of the Division of Heath Psychology (DHP); Dr David Harper, CPsychol, AFBPsS, Professor David Pilgrim CPsychol, AFBPsS, and Professor Richard Bentall, FBPsS, all members of the DCP; Lucy Johnstone, CPsychol, AFBPsS, committee member of the DCP; Dr Amanda C de C Williams, CPsychol, member of both the DCP and the DHP, and Professor Pamela James, CPsychol, AFBPsS, committee member of the Division of Counselling Psychology.
 We would like to thank
Berry Neil for informing aspects of this response. We hope you find our comments useful. Dr C A Allan, CPsychol, CSci, AFBPsS Chair, Professional Practice Board DSM-5 2011
British Psychological Society response, June 2011
Page 2 of 26

General comments
The Society is concerned that clients and the general public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of
their natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences which demand
helping responses, but which do not reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We therefore do welcome the proposal to include a profile of rating the severity of different symptoms over the preceding month. This is
attractive, not only because it focuses on specific problems (see below), but because it introduces the concept of variability more fully
into the system. That said, we have more concerns than plaudits.
The putative diagnoses presented in DSM-V are clearly based largely on social norms, with 'symptoms' that all rely on subjective
judgements, with little confirmatory physical 'signs' or evidence of biological causation. The criteria are not value-free, but rather reflect
current normative social expectations. Many researchers have pointed out that psychiatric diagnoses are plagued by problems of
reliability, validity, prognostic value, and co-morbidity.
Diagnostic categories do not predict response to medication or other interventions whereas more specific formulations or symptom
clusters might (Moncrieff, 2007).
Finally, disorders categorised as ‘not otherwise specified’ are huge (running at 30% of all personality disorder diagnoses for example).
Personality disorder and psychoses are particularly troublesome as they are not adequately normed on the general population, where
community surveys regularly report much higher prevalence and incidence than would be expected. This problem – as well as
threatening the validity of the approach – has significant implications. If community samples show high levels of ‘prevalence’, social
factors are minimised, and the continuum with normality is ignored. Then many of the people who describe normal forms of distress
like feeling bereaved after three months, or traumatised by military conflict for more than a month, will meet diagnostic criteria.
In this context, we have significant concerns over consideration of inclusion of both “at-risk mental state” (prodrome) and “attenuated
psychosis syndrome”. We recognise that the first proposal has now been dropped – and we welcome this. But the concept of “attenuated psychosis system” appears very worrying; it could be seen as an opportunity to stigmatize eccentric people, and to lower the threshold for achieving a diagnosis of psychosis Diagnostic systems such as these therefore fall short of the criteria for legitimate medical diagnoses. They certainly identify troubling or troubled people, but do not meet the criteria for categorisation demanded for a field of science or medicine (with a very few exceptions such as dementia.) We are also concerned that systems such as this are based on identifying problems as located within individuals.
This misses the relational context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For psychologists, our wellbeing
and mental health stem from our frameworks of understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.

The Society recommends a revision of the way mental distress is thought about, starting with recognition of the overwhelming evidence
that it is on a spectrum with 'normal' experience, and that psychosocial factors such as poverty, unemployment and trauma are the most
strongly-evidenced causal factors. Rather than applying preordained diagnostic categories to clinical populations, we believe that any
classification system should begin from the bottom up – starting with specific experiences, problems or ‘symptoms’ or ‘complaints’.
Statistical analyses of problems from community samples show that they do not map onto past or current categories (Mirowsky, 1990,
Mirowsky & Ross, 2003). We would like to see the base unit of measurement as specific problems (e.g. hearing voices, feelings of
anxiety etc)? These would be more helpful too in terms of epidemiology.
While some people find a name or a diagnostic label helpful, our contention is that this helpfulness results from a knowledge that their
problems are recognised (in both senses of the word) understood, validated, explained (and explicable) and have some relief. Clients
often, unfortunately, find that diagnosis offers only a spurious promise of such benefits. Since – for example – two people with a
diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ or ‘personality disorder’ may possess no two symptoms in common, it is difficult to see what communicative
benefit is served by using these diagnoses. We believe that a description of a person’s real problems would suffice. Moncrieff and
others have shown that diagnostic labels are less useful than a description of a person’s problems for predicting treatment response, so
again diagnoses seem positively unhelpful compared to the alternatives. There is ample evidence from psychological therapies that
case formulations (whether from a single theoretical perspective or more integrative) are entirely possible to communicate to staff or
clients.
We therefore believe that alternatives to diagnostic frameworks exist, should be preferred, and should be developed with as much
investment of resource and effort as has been expended on revising DSM-IV. The Society would be happy to help in such an exercise.
References
Mirowsky, John. 1990. "Subjective Boundaries and Combinations in Psychiatric Diagnosis." Journal of Mind and Behavior 11(3): 407-
24.
Mirowsky, John, and Catherine E. Ross. 2003. Social Causes of Psychological Distress, 2nd Edition. New Brunswick, N.J.: Aldine
Transaction
Moncrieff J (1995) Lithium revisited. “A re-examination of the placebo-controlled trials”. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 167: 569-573
Moncrieff, J (2003) “Clozapine v. conventional antipsychotic drugs for treatment-resistant schizophrenia: a re-examination”. The British
Journal of Psychiatry. 183: 161-166
Moncrieff, J (2007) The Myth of the Chemical Cure: a critique of psychiatric drug treatment. (1 vols). Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke,
Hampshire
Moncrieff J, & Kirsch I (2005) “Efficacy of antidepressants in adults”. BMJ 331 : 155 doi: 10.1136
Moncrieff, J & Timimi, S (2010) “Is ADHD a valid diagnosis in adults? No”. BMJ 2010; 340:c547 doi: 10.1136/bmj.c547
DSM-5 2011

Comments on specific disorders
Code 
A 00-01
A 02-08
A 09
Intellectual Developmental Disorders
Communication Disorders
Autism Spectrum Disorder
We have no specific comments on these disorders, other than to say that, in our opinion, the use of diagnostic labels has greater validity, both on theoretical and empirical grounds in these areas.
A 10 Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the experiences and learning through our lives.
We have particular concerns about the inclusion of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in this categorisation. Many of the concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses per se (articulated above) apply to ADHD. We are very concerned at the increasing use of this diagnosis and of the increasing use of
medication for children, and would be very concerned to see these increase further.

A 11 Other Specified Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
We have particular concerns about the inclusion of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder in this categorisation. Many of the concerns about the scientific validity and
utility of diagnoses per se (articulated above) apply to ADHD. We are very
concerned at the increasing use of this diagnosis and of the increasing use of
medication for children, and would be very concerned to see these increase further.
In addition, we have serious concerns about the widespread use of the ‘other’ or ‘not
otherwise specified’ categories, which, in this context, appear to exacerbate all the
problems of labelling with invalid diagnostic labels.
A 12-15
A 16-22
Learning Disorders (Learning
Disorder, Dyslexia, Dyscalculia,
Disorder of Written Expression), Motor
Disorders
We have no specific comments on these disorders, other than to say that, in our
opinion, the use of diagnostic labels has greater validity, both on theoretical and
empirical grounds in these areas.
DSM-5 2011

B 00 Schizophrenia As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above are particularly relevant to the diagnosis of schizophrenia. We note in
particular, that the invalidity of this diagnosis is such that it is entirely possible for two
individuals with the diagnosis to share no characteristics or symptoms. We also note
the poor prognostic and therapeutic validity of this group of diagnoses.
B01 Schizotypal Personality Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above are particularly relevant to the diagnosis of Schizotypal Personality Disorder –
as it suffers from the problems associated with personality disorder more generally,
as well as problems associated with psychosis.

B02 Schizophreniform Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above are particularly relevant to the diagnosis of Schizophreniform Disorder, which
appears to be a reflection of vague concerns about a person’s mental health –
effectively one of many ‘catch-all’ classifications.
B03 Brief Psychotic Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above are particularly relevant to the diagnosis of Brief Psychotic Disorder, given the
problems associated with psychiatric labels, the particular consequences of a
psychotic label and the known transience of many of these fleeting psychosis-like
experiences.

B04 Delusional Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above apply equally to the diagnosis of Delusional Disorder.
B05 Schizoaffective Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above apply equally to the diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder.

B06 Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
We have significant concerns over the inclusion of “attenuated psychosis syndrome”.
The concept of “attenuated psychosis system” appears very worrying; it looks like an
opportunity to stigmatize eccentric people, and to lower the threshold for achieving a
diagnosis of psychosis (and hence increasing the number the people receiving
antipsychotic medication and a range of other social ills).
B07-14 Substance-Induced Psychotic
Disorder
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems.
For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses articulated
above are particularly relevant to the diagnosis of Substance-Induced Psychotic
Disorder. People take drugs; these drugs affect their mental state and can have
long-term consequences. That appears somewhat different from a diagnosis of
conventional medical illnesses.

B15 Psychotic Disorder Associated with a
Known General Medical Condition
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
These concerns include the association between physical and psychological health –
where we believe it is unnecessary and misleading to represent such associations as
‘psychiatric illnesses’ – and ‘catch-all’ classifications such as ‘unspecified’ or ‘other’.
B16 Catatonic Disorder Associated with a
Known General Medical Condition
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
These concerns include the association between physical and psychological health –
where we believe it is unnecessary and misleading to represent such associations as
‘psychiatric illnesses’ – and ‘catch-all’ classifications such as ‘unspecified’ or ‘other’.
B17 Other Specified Psychotic Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
These concerns include the association between physical and psychological health –
where we believe it is unnecessary and misleading to represent such associations as
‘psychiatric illnesses’ – and ‘catch-all’ classifications such as ‘unspecified’ or ‘other’.
B18 Unspecified Psychotic Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
These concerns include the association between physical and psychological health –
where we believe it is unnecessary and misleading to represent such associations as
‘psychiatric illnesses’ – and ‘catch-all’ classifications such as ‘unspecified’ or ‘other’.

B19 Unspecified Catatonic Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
These concerns include the association between physical and psychological health –
where we believe it is unnecessary and misleading to represent such associations as
‘psychiatric illnesses’ – and ‘catch-all’ classifications such as ‘unspecified’ or ‘other’.
C00-06 Bipolar and related disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses
articulated above apply equally to the area of bipolar disorder and related disorders.

D01-02
and
D04-09
Depressive Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses
articulated above apply equally to the area of depressive disorders. We note that, in
this context, sadness and unhappiness which are deserving of help and intervention
– are not best considered illnesses. We also note that, by regarding them as such,
there is a danger of misunderstanding their nature and cause and applying
inappropriate medical remedies.

D00 Disruptive Mood Dysregulation
Disorder
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses
articulated above apply equally to the area of depressive disorders. We note that, in
this context, sadness and unhappiness which are deserving of help and intervention
– are not best considered illnesses. We also note that, by regarding them as such,
there is a danger of misunderstanding their nature and cause and applying
inappropriate medical remedies.
We have particular concerns at the inclusion of this diagnosis, whose essential
characteristics: “...severe recurrent temper outbursts in response to common
stressors....” appear to reflect exactly those normative judgements referred to above.

D03 Chronic Depressive Disorder
(Dysthymia)
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These general concerns about the scientific validity and utility of diagnoses
articulated above apply equally to the area of depressive disorders. We note that, in
this context, sadness and unhappiness which are deserving of help and intervention
– are not best considered illnesses. We also note that, by regarding them as such,
there is a danger of misunderstanding their nature and cause and applying
inappropriate medical remedies.
We have particular concerns at the inclusion of this diagnosis, whose essential
characteristics: “...depressed mood for most of the day...” certainly reflects a state of
affairs that any humane individual should attempt to address, but does not appear to
reflect any form of medical illness.

E00-14 Anxiety Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
The concerns noted above also apply to anxiety disorders. We note that many
people have experienced, and live in, circumstances that reasonably induce normal
and understandable anxiety. We further note that many of the specific diagnoses –
particularly social anxiety and generalised anxiety disorder – appear, again, to reflect
conditions that are understandable, and deserving of help and intervention, but are
not best considered illnesses. We also note that, again, by regarding them as such,
there is a danger of misunderstanding their nature and cause and applying
inappropriate medical remedies.
F 00-09 Obsessive-Compulsive and Related
Disorders
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
Although obsessive-compulsive problems appear to have more empirical validity
than some other disorders, many of the concerns noted above also apply here –
particularly the concerns over inappropriate medicalisation and potential overreliance
on medical interventions.

G00-08 Trauma- and Stressor-Related
Disorders
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
Again, we have concerns in the area of trauma-related disorders. Obviously it is
right and proper to recognise the effects of traumatic events on people, and to be
able to offer appropriate help. In this context however, we fear that those benefits
might be made more difficult if, instead of recognising the effects of traumatic events
on people, these were considered to be ‘disorders’ or ‘illnesses’. As noted above,
there are more appropriate conceptualisations.
H00-05 Dissociative Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These concerns also apply to this area.

J00 Complex Somatic Symptom Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
Many of these concerns also apply to this area.
It is good to see the assumptions implicit in ‘somatization’ terminology have been
removed, but we retain concerns about the criteria used.
Concern about medical seriousness arises from the universal experience of pain as
a warning signal of something wrong, as in many acute pains. Until and unless an
adequate explanation is given to the person with persistent pain, distinguishing it
from the ‘alarm signal’ of acute pain, they continue to search for a medical
explanation as is the case in acute pain. “Reassurance” that nothing shows on
investigation often exacerbates the patient’s concerns that what they have is hard to
detect or diagnose. The judgment of what is ‘disproportionate’ or ‘excessive’ is a
subjective, value-laden, issue.

J01 Simple Somatic Symptom Disorder As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
Many of these concerns also apply to this area.
It is good to see the assumptions implicit in ‘somatization’ terminology have been
removed, but we retain concerns about the criteria used.
Concern about medical seriousness arises from the universal experience of pain as
a warning signal of something wrong, as in many acute pains. Until and unless an
adequate explanation is given to the person with persistent pain, distinguishing it
from the ‘alarm signal’ of acute pain, they continue to search for a medical
explanation as is the case in acute pain. “Reassurance” that nothing shows on
investigation often exacerbates the patient’s concerns that what they have is hard to
detect or diagnose. The judgment of what is ‘disproportionate’ or ‘excessive’ is a
subjective, value-laden, issue.
J02-06 Somatic Symptom Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
Many of these concerns also apply to this area.

K00-07 Feeding and Eating Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These concerns also apply to this area.
L00-01 Elimination Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These concerns also apply to this area.

M00-20 Sleep-Wake Disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
These concerns also apply to this area.
N00-10 Sexual Dysfunctions As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
All the comments made earlier apply also here.
Of particular concern are the subjective and socially normative aspects of sexual
behaviour. It is a matter of record that homosexuality used to be considered a
symptom of illness. The Society would not be able to support considering sexual
differences as symptoms of illness.

P00-03 Gender Dysphoria As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
All the comments made earlier apply also here.
Of particular concern are the subjective and socially normative aspects of sexual
behaviour. We are very concerned at the inclusion of children and adolescents in
this area. There is controversy in this particular area – the concept of a ‘diagnosis’ of
a ‘psychiatric disorder’ disputed.
Labelling people who need help as ‘ill’ may make supportive and therapeutic
responses more difficult.

Q00-07 Disruptive, Impulse Control and
Conduct Disorders
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
All the comments made earlier apply also here. Of particular concern are the
subjective and socially normative aspects of conformist behaviour. We are very
concerned that ‘headstrong’ behaviour is considered to be pathognomic of an illness
(in Oppositional Defiant Disorder). Many people – many governments – would like
children and citizens to be less defiant and more compliant. However, it is not a
symptom of illness to be defiant. It may be a social or psychological problem to be
addressed, but it may, in some circumstances, be a characteristic to be praised.
An ‘unspecified’ disruptive or impulse control disorder, in this context, is even more
subjective, value-laden, conceptually confused, and therefore worrying.

R00-31 Substance Use and Addictive
Disorders
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
We note with concern the concept of ‘Gambling Disorder’. Gambling is a problem,
and it is a social phenomenon and issue that requires study and response.
However, we feel it is conceptually wrong to regard this as an illness with symptoms.
We recognise that here – as in other ‘disorders’ – no concept of organic pathology is
necessarily implied (DSM-V is, we recognise, intended to be a useful list of
‘disorders’), but we also are aware that inclusion in such a list has implications, and
we strongly feel that an alternative non-medical conceptualisation is called for.
S00-35 Neurocognitive Disorders We have no specific comments on these disorders, other than to say that, in our
opinion, the use of diagnostic labels has greater validity, both on theoretical and
empirical grounds in these areas.

Personality disorders The Society has several concerns in this area.
While a hybrid dimensional-categorical model for personality and personality
disorder assessment and diagnosis may be welcome, little of that is visible.
As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
We are particularly concerned that the system proposes to diagnose psychiatric
disorder on a rating of “quite a bit” on personality trait domains.

U00-09 Paraphilias As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
All these comments apply also here. Again, of particular concern are the subjective
and socially normative aspects of sexual behaviour. It is a matter of record that
homosexuality used to be considered a symptom of illness. The Society would not
be able to support considering sexual differences as symptoms of illness.
We, finally, have severe misgivings about the inclusion of “Paraphilic Coercive
Disorder” in the appendix. Rape is a crime, not a disorder. Such behaviours can, of
course, be understood, but we disagree that such a pattern of behaviour could be
considered a disorder, and we would have grave concerns that such views may offer
a spurious and unscientific defence to a rapist in a criminal trial.

V01-06 Other disorders As stated in our general comments, we are concerned that clients and the general
public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their
natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly
have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not
reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.
We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational
context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For
psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of
understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the
experiences and learning through our lives.
Clearly it is good for healthcare professionals and others to recognise self-harm.
However, we do not believe that self-harm should be classified as a symptom of a
disorder. Rather we would support recognising this behaviour, understanding it and
offering help.
Similarly, a “pattern of falsification of physical or psychological signs or symptoms, or
of induction of injury or disease” is a worrying and important phenomenon. But again
it should be understood and responded to, not conceptualised as a symptom of an
illness.

No comments:

Post a Comment

PLEASE ADD COMMENTS SO I CAN IMPROVE THE INFORMATION I AM SHARING ON THIS VERY IMPORTANT TOPIC.